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Insecurity and Welfare: 
Evidence from County Datai 
 
 
Marcel Fafchamps, Oxford University, UKii 
Bart Minten, IFPRI, Indiaiii 
 
 
ABSTRACT  Using original survey data collected at the county (commune) level, we examine the 
relationship between insecurity and welfare. Correcting for unobserved heterogeneity at the 
commune level, we find that insecurity is associated with lower incomes and health status in all our 
analysis, and it is associated with lower school enrollment and higher infant mortality in some 
regressions. Results are robust to the inclusion of shocks potentially affecting both welfare and 
insecurity. We further find a significant association between insecurity and the provision of certain 
public services, notably schooling and health care. A similar relationship is found with the 
placement of development projects. Taken together, the evidence suggests that insecurity is an 
important determinant of welfare in the country studied. 
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I. Introduction 
 
It is increasingly recognized that human welfare is affected by the insecurity brought up by war, 
civil strife, and crime (e.g. Clinard and Abbott, 1973; Bourguignon, 2000). Direct effects arise from 
victimization and the fear it instills in neighbors, relatives, and members of the community at large. 
Indirect effects come from reduced investment and incomes and from diminished provision of -- 
and access to -- public services. 
 
This paper examines the indirect effect of crime-driven insecurity on incomes and public services. 
We test whether insecurity is associated with a reduction in various welfare indicators. Attempts to 
investigate this relationship are typically hindered by the need to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity. We overcome this difficulty by using what amounts to location-specific fixed 
effects. Other empirical investigations of insecurity and welfare have relied primarily on cross-
country comparisons (e.g. Soares, 2004; Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza, 2002a, 2002b; Gaviria 
and Pages, 2001), with all the difficulties inherent to this kind of research -- e.g., different data 
sources, time period, cultures, etc. Here we use data coming from a single country that were 
collected at the same time using the same questionnaire. The data covers the whole country. 
 
Results show that an increase in insecurity is associated with a significant reduction in incomes and 
in access to health centers and schools. The effect is robust to the inclusion of various controls, and 
the use of alternative methods such as propensity score matching or instrumental variable 
regression. We also investigate possible channels through which insecurity may affect welfare. We 
find that a rise in insecurity in a given location is associated with a reduction in the likelihood that a 
new school or health center is built there. We also provide evidence that insecurity is associated 
with a reduction in the likelihood of attracting a development project. Results further indicate that 
certain types of economic activity such as large-scale manufacturing are more sensitive to changes 
in insecurity than others, like small-scale mining. 
 
These findings are by themselves not surprising. What is surprising is that they are so strong in a 
country that is not known for drug trade or guerilla activity. In spite of attracting many tourists and 
sizeable foreign investment, the studied country suffers from what could be called pervasive low-
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level insecurity. Much of it is related to property crime and the ineffectiveness of the police and 
prison system (e.g. Ministère de la Justice, 1999; Fafchamps and Moser, 2003). This study shows 
that crime and the feelings of insecurity it generates seem to have large welfare effects through 
economic activity and the provision of public services. 
 
Since Becker’s (1968) initial foray, an economic literature on crime has emerged and is now well 
established in developed countries. Much of this work has focused on the issues of deterrence (e.g. 
Ehrlich and Brower, 1987; Ehrlich, 1996; Levitt, 1996, 1997, 1998; Farmer and Terrell, 2001) and 
the determinants of criminal behavior (e.g. Ehrlich, 1975; Blau and Blau, 1982; Sah, 1991; Ludwig, 
Duncan and Hirschfield, 2001; Morgan, 2000; Freeman, 1996; Raphael and Winter-Ember, 2001; 
DiIulio, 1996). Some work has also been done on the cost of crime prevention to individuals and on 
the effect that crime has on investment and the choice of residence (e.g. Cullen and Levitt, 1999; 
Freeman, Grogger and Sonstelie, 1996; Helsley and Strange, 1999).   
 
More recently, the literature has turned to the study of crime in poor and middle-income countries. 
In a series of articles relying on cross-country comparisons, Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza 
show that crime-related insecurity hurts growth (e.g. Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza, 1998, 
2000, 2002a, 2002b; Lederman, Loayza and Menendez, 2000). There is also a growing body of 
work based on micro data. Pradhan and Ravallion (1999), for instance, show that insecurity ranks 
high on the welfare priorities of Tanzanian dwellers. Demombynes and Ozler (2002) examine 
crime in South Africa and show that high crime rates in poor districts spill over to richer 
neighborhoods. Using data from Madagascar, Fafchamps and Moser (2003) show that the incidence 
of certain categories of crime is higher in isolated areas than in urban centers, thereby reversing the 
general perception that crime is primarily an urban phenomenon. The authors also show that police 
deterrence is ineffective in Madagascar. Fafchamps and Minten (2006) further show that an 
exogenous increase in poverty is associated with a rise in crop theft. 
 
This literature has recently been joined by economic work on conflicts. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) 
and Collier and Hoeffler (2002) have shown that many violent political conflicts follow an 
economic rationale, particularly the capture of a valuable income source such as a diamond mine. 
Using cross-country evidence, Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom (2004) show that once initiated, 
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violent political conflict tends to persist. The relationship between crime and conflicts is examined 
by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) who provide evidence that conflicts fuel crime but not the reverse. 
Using panel household data from Uganda which has been plagued by civil war for a decade or 
more, Deininger (2003) shows that civil strife reduces welfare, but crime does not. In contrast to 
the existing literature, this paper empirically tests the association between welfare and insecurity 
and investigates the channels through which these effects are likely to take place. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly present the conceptual framework and 
testing strategy. Section 3 discusses the data and presents summary statistics. In Section 4 we test 
whether insecurity reduces welfare. Section 5 examines a number of channels through which 
insecurity affects welfare. Conclusions and suggestions for further research are presented at the 
end. 
 
II. Conceptual Framework 
 
Following Becker (1968), it is now customary to recognize that crime responds to economic 
incentives. Crime is also widely believed to affect economic incentives, although the magnitude of 
this effect is unclear. Other sources of insecurity, such as riots, civil wars and political conflict, are 
similarly thought to influence economic outcomes. 
 
To investigate the relationship between insecurity and welfare, we estimate regressions of the form: 
Wit = αSit + βCit + µi + εit   (1) 
where Wit is a welfare indicator for location i at time t, Sit is a measure of insecurity, Cit is a vector 
of controls, µi is a fixed effect, and εit is an error term. The fixed effect captures any location-
specific time-invariant factor that may affect welfare. Controlling for such effects is essential 
because many location-specific features such as isolation or population density may influence 
welfare as well as insecurity. Failing to control for these factors may generate a spurious correlation 
between welfare and insecurity. 
 
Differencing (1) to eliminate the fixed effect, we obtain a regression model of the form: 
∆Wit = α∆Sit + β∆Cit + ∆εit   (2) 
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where the notation ∆xit ≡  xit - xit-1. Equation (2) regresses changes in welfare on changes in 
insecurity, controlling for various other effects so as to minimize omitted variable bias. Estimating 
(2) for various welfare indicators is the first purpose of our econometric analysis. 
 
We also wish to investigate the channels through which insecurity may affect welfare. To do so, we 
examine whether insecurity is associated with a number of potential channels Nit which are 
generally regarded as strongly related with specific dimensions of welfare. For instance, health is 
affected by the presence or absence of health facilities. We can therefore test whether an increase in 
insecurity is associated with a lower likelihood of creation of a health facility in a given location, 
i.e., whether: 
∆Nit = γ∆Sit + νit    (3) 
 
Here as before, differentiating eliminates time-invariant fixed effects that may be correlated with 
insecurity as well as with the presence of a health facility. 
 
III. The Data 
 
The purpose of the rest of this paper is to estimate equations (2) and (3) using comprehensive 
survey data on Madagascar. Madagascar constitutes a perfect test case for an investigation of 
insecurity and welfare. The country is quite poor, with a GDP per head of US$260 in 2002 (World 
Bank, 2003). The Malagasy government estimates that 69% of the population are below the poverty 
line (e.g. GOM, 2003; Mistiaen, Ozler, Razafimanantena and Razafindravonona, 2002). The 
country is also known to have a high crime rate (Fafchamps andMoser, 2003). 
 
A map of Madagascar with provincial and communal boundaries is shown in Figure 1. Population 
density is depicted in shades of grey. With a population of 16 million and a size equivalent to that 
of France, Belgium, and Holland combined, Madagascar has a low population density -- the median 
population density in each commune is 26 inhabitants per square Km. We see that population is 
densest in the Central highlands around the main cities of Antananarivo (the capital city) and 
Antsirabe. The Eastern highlands and coast between Toamasina and Fianarantsoa are also heavily 
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populated. This largely reflects climate patterns that make these areas more productive for 
agriculture. Other major cities such as Toamasina, Mahajanga, Toliara, and Antsiranana are coastal 
port cities with a small rural hinterland surrounding them. The Western and Southwestern parts of 
the country are more arid and much less populated. 
 
Although Madagascar has not experienced any major armed conflict since independence,iv 
insecurity is known to be a major problem. Fafchamps and Moser (2003) provide evidence that the 
homicide rates are comparable to that of the US in the early 1990s, when they were at its highest. 
Cattle rustling is a major problem in low population density area, with extremely high rates of 
cattle theft and the involvement of organized crime (e.g. Rasamoelina, 2000; Razafitsiamidy, 
1997). Crop theft is also a commonly cited problem, and Fafchamps and Minten (2006) show an 
exogenous increase in poverty to be associated with a rise in crop theft. 
 
Insecurity appears to be related to insufficient law enforcement. Ministère de la Justice (1999) and 
Root (1993) provide ample evidence that the legal system is not running effectively. Fafchamps 
and Moser (2003) show that law enforcement has no deterrent effect on crime. Survey responses 
suggest that, in some parts of the country, criminals who are caught do not spend any time in jail 
because of inefficient courts and lax prison rules. In these circumstances, we would expect 
insecurity to have a measurable impact on welfare. 
 
The data on which we base our empirical analysis comes from a survey conducted by the authors in 
2001. Our unit of analysis is the commune, a geographically defined administrative unit roughly 
equivalent to a municipality or county. Madagascar has six provinces (or faritany), which are 
divided into fivondronanas. The fivondronana are made up of communes -- the smallest 
administrative units with direct representation from the central or provincial government. Rural 
communes are further divided into fokontanys, which essentially represent individual villages. As 
of late 2001, there were approximately 1390 communes in Madagascar.v 
 
The crime statistics and other data used in this paper were all collected as part of the commune 
survey. The survey was conducted over a three-month period in 2001 in collaboration between 
Cornell University, Oxford University, and the Malagasy agricultural research institute (FOFIFA). 
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A total of 1385 communes were surveyed, all but 9 currently functioning communes.vi The 
remoteness of some communes and the general lack of national data on certain subjects meant that 
little was known about the spatial distribution of public goods and services, economic activity, or 
insecurity prior to the survey. 
 
The survey was conducted at the commune's administrative center. Enumerators were instructed to 
gather a number of statistics from the relevant government offices in the commune. More 
subjective questions, such as those concerning community perceptions of existing conditions, were 
answered by a focus group composed of a small group of prominent residents of the commune -- 
typically municipality officials and key informants. Crime statistics were collected only for 1999, 
2000 and 2001 so as to minimize recall bias. To the best of our knowledge, there does not exist 
systematic time series crime data on all the municipalities of the country. 
 
Descriptive statistics on insecurity and welfare are presented in Table 1. Focus group respondents 
were asked whether insecurity improved or worsened in their commune over the five years period 
preceding the survey. Their subjective assessment is reported in the first column of Table 1. We see 
that 30% of respondents estimate that the level of insecurity in their commune improved between 
1996 and 2001 while 51% estimate that it worsened. Only 19% responded that it remained 
unchanged. 
 
Focus group respondents were also asked whether average income in the commune increased or fell 
over the same period. Responses are summarized in column 2 of Table 1. In half of the communes, 
respondents stated that the average income in their commune rose while 35% stated that it fell. 
Similar questions were asked regarding the health status of inhabitants, school enrollment, and 
infant mortality in the commune. The reader should keep in mind that, for the first three variables 
an increase is good, but for infant mortality it is bad. A majority of respondents felt that health 
status and school enrollment have increased, while infant mortality has decreased. 
 
Many of the nefarious effects of insecurity depend on perceived risk and thus on perceptions of 
insecurity. Responses to the insecurity question therefore provide a measure of insecurity that is 
more economically relevant than actual crime statistics. The reader may nevertheless wonder 
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whether subjective perceptions by focus group respondents bear any relationship with actual risk. 
To investigate this, we compare subjective perception of insecurity to crime incidence figures. 
 
Respondents were asked to rank the security situation in their commune. Responses, presented in 
Table 2, show that 28% of respondents find the security situation either bad or very bad while 25% 
find it good or very good. The others find it average. Recognized high crime areas have been 
flagged as a 'red zone' by the government; 30% of the country's communes are counted as part of 
the 'red zone'. Table 2 also presents stated development priorities of commune respondents. 
Insecurity comes third in this ranking, being the top development priority for 15% of the 
communes, and second priority for another 13% of communes. Insecurity is especially a concern in 
remote communes, a result in line with the work of Fafchamps and Moser (2003). Since remote 
communes also tend to be larger, when we weigh responses by area we find that insecurity is the 
first or second development priority in communes representing 43% of the country's area. 
 
It is of interest to examine whether subjective assessments of insecurity are related to actual 
insecurity. Given the absence of civil unrest during the period under investigation, crime must the 
primary source of insecurity. In the second panel of Table 2 we report crime statistics collected in 
the commune survey. These statistics were collected separately for 1999, 2000 and 2001. Here they 
are averaged over the three year period 1999-2001 and reported per 100,000 inhabitants. 
 
Of the five types of criminal activity recorded in the commune survey, cattle rustling is the most 
common. An average of 80 or so head of cattle are stolen on average each year in each commune -- 
an average of 1500 or so head of cattle per 100,000 inhabitants. This figure is influenced by a 
number of a small number of very large outliers where cattle rustling takes place at an `industrial' 
level. But the median is still 62 head of cattle reported stolen each year per 100,000 inhabitants.vii  
Burglaries are the next most common type of crime, with some 43 burglaries on average per year 
per 100,000 inhabitants. The average number of reported homicides is higher than the high US 
national average from the early 1990's: 8.5 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (Fox and Zawitz, 
2000). This number is a bit higher than the 1994 national average of 6.4 intentional homicides 
reported in Fajnzylber et al. (1998). The median number of homicides is much lower, suggesting 
that crime is concentrated in certain communes. As shown by Fafchamps and Moser (2003), the 
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highest homicide rates are found in isolated, less densely populated areas. The incidence of rape 
appears low, with less than three reported cases on average per 100,000 inhabitants. This is likely 
due to under-reporting bias. Vehicle theft is extremely rare, reflecting the low number of personal 
vehicles on the island and the fact that few people know how to drive. 
 
To ascertain the validity of the subjective assessment of the security situation by survey 
respondents, we would like to regress this ranking on crime statistics. Before we do so, however, 
we worry that the responses given in the commune survey may be influenced in a systematic 
manner by the composition of the focus group. It is conceivable, for instance, that members of 
specific professions may be more sensitive to crime and tend to over-report it. To the extent that the 
composition of the focus group is correlated with location and crime, this may result in a spurious 
relationship. At the bottom of Table 2 we present the information we have regarding the 
composition of focus groups. The average number of participants is close to 9 people. Communal 
employees and social service workers represent over 60% of the respondents. This is unsurprising 
since they are likely to be the best source of quantitative information about communal affairs. 
There is also a non-negligible proportion of farmers and this proportion varies from focus group to 
focus group. 
 
Table 3 reports an ordered probit regression of the subjective insecurity ranking on the five crime 
rate variables and the red zone dummy. Focus group variables are included to control, to the extent 
possible, for response bias. Results demonstrate that insecurity as perceived by focus group 
respondents largely reflects actual crime: the red zone dummy and three of the five crime variables 
are significant -- often at the 1% level.viii Car theft is not significant, most probably because it is 
very rare. From these observations we conclude that the subjective assessment of insecurity 
reported by respondents is closely related with objective risk measures; it is not just driven by 
irrational fear and prejudice. 
 
These results are consistent with earlier studies which have shown that, in Madagascar, perceived 
insecurity is significantly related to the prevalence of crime which, in the studied country, increases 
with isolation (Fafchamps and Moser, 2003) and poverty (Fafchamps and Minten, 2006). While in 
developed economies most crime occurs in urban areas, Fafchamps and Moser (2003) have shown 
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that in Madagascar crime rates are higher in isolated rural areas and that much crime is associated 
with cattle rustling. This is confirmed in Table 3: cattle theft has a strong effect on feelings of 
insecurity, either directly (the coefficient of cattle theft has a t-value close to 8) or indirectly 
through the `zone rouge' (high crime) dummy, which is exclusively rural and concentrated in high 
cattle theft areas. Anthropological studies of cattle theft in Madagascar document the role of 
organized roaming gangs that steal cattle from one commune and walk it over long distances to sell 
it elsewhere. Similar observations have been made for Northern Kenya by McPeak and Barrett 
(2001). 
 
IV. Insecurity and Welfare 
 
We now examine the relationship between perceived insecurity and the four welfare measures 
collected in the survey -- income, access to health care, access to schooling, and infant mortality. 
Since all five measures compare the situation prevailing at the time of the survey with that 
prevailing five years earlier, they are already in differenced form, i.e., as they appear in equation 
(2). 
 
Ordered probit regression results are presented in Table 4. Focus group composition variables are 
included as controls for possible response bias. Results show a strong negative association between 
an increase in insecurity over the period 1996-2001 and an improvement in income, health status, 
and school enrollment. Put differently, communes that experienced an increase in insecurity 
experienced a significantly lower increase in income, health status, or school enrollment. Infant 
mortality increases with insecurity but the effect is not statistically significant. These results 
suggest that insecurity is significantly and negatively associated with several dimensions of 
welfare. 
 
The question that immediately follows is through what channel(s) this relationship occurs. Before 
we turn to this question, however, we must verify that the results shown in Table 4 are robust. The 
first possibility we investigate is the idea that both insecurity and welfare were affected by some 
other factor, resulting in a spurious relationship. For instance, it is conceivable that communes 
affected by a cyclone or a drought experienced a fall in income and a rise in insecurity, as shown 
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for instance for Tanzania by Miguel (2003). To reduce the chance of such omitted variable bias, we 
include as additional regressors a number of variables capturing a wide variety of shocks. This 
approach does not entirely eliminate the risk of omitted variable bias, but it is the best we can do 
with the data at hand. 
 
Shock variables are described in Table 5. Each variable measures the number of years, over the 
three years preceding the survey, during which a given shock or disease affected the commune. 
Each variable takes values from 0 (no year) to 3 (in all three years). As evidenced by Table 5, the 
list of shock variables is quite long as it includes climatic events (cyclone, drought, flood), plant 
pests and diseases (locusts, rice fleas), human diseases, and livestock diseases. Bad climatic events 
are a frequent occurrence, the late start of the rains being the most often cited shock. Cyclones hit 
the East coast of the country every year, devastating crops, causing floods, and cutting roads. Some 
human diseases, malaria for instance, are endemic in most of the country so there is very little 
variation from year to year. Others such as plague vary over time. 
 
An additional source of concern is the possibility that disgruntled or pessimistic focus groups may 
respond to all questions in a negative manner. This would generate a response bias that would be 
common to the insecurity variable and the variables measuring changes in welfare over time. The 
analysis presented in Table 2 suggests that subjective perceptions about the level of insecurity 
correlate well with objective measures of crime, but here we are concerned about subjective 
perceptions about changes in insecurity. Unfortunately commune-level crime statistics going back 
to 1996 and before do not exist for Madagascar. Consequently we cannot conduct the same analysis 
as we did in Table 2 by regressing perceptions about changes in insecurity on changes in reported 
crime between 1996 and 2001. 
 
We seek to address this concern by constructing two proxies for `gripe'. Including these proxies as 
additional controls should reduce the omitted variable bias. We also construct our first proxy for 
gripe using the residual from the regression presented in Table 3. For memory, in that regression 
we regress the level of insecurity -- as reported by the focus group at the time of the survey -- on 
recent crime statistics. The error term from this regression can be taken as a proxy for the focus 
group's tendency to over-report insecurity. 
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The second proxy we construct uses answers to focus group questions that are not directly related 
to welfare or insecurity but are likely to be correlated with ‘gripe’. More specifically, we use 
answers to questions on late rains and total rainfall over the three years preceding the survey, as 
reported by the focus group. We combine answers to construct an index of how much the 
respondents complained about bad rains. We then regress this index on the value of the same index 
averaged over neighboring communes. The idea is that rainfall in communes nearby should be 
correlated with own rainfall but not with the pessimistic temperament of the respondents. Results 
are shown in Appendix, Table A1. The regression is highly significant, with an R2 of 0.24. The 
residual from this regression measures how much more than neighboring communes the 
respondents complained about rainfall. This residual is a proxy for gripe if we are willing to assume 
that rainfall is spatially correlated -- so that rainfall in neighboring communes is a good predictor -- 
and that gripe is distributed more or less independently across communes. While there is little 
doubt about the first assumption, we unfortunately have no way of verifying the second. The 
validity of the procedure therefore rests on this maintained assumption. 
 
Table 6 presents ordered probit regressions of changes in welfare indicators on changes in 
insecurity, the composition of the focus group, the two proxies for ‘gripe’, and the various shock 
and disease variables listed in Table 5.ix We see that the insecurity coefficients retain the same sign 
and magnitude in all four regressions. They remain significantly negative in the first two 
regressions, but they are not significant in the other two. Except for one coefficient which is 
significant at the 10% level, the gripe variables are not significant. 
 
Although shock and disease variables are used here only as controls, it is instructive to check 
whether they have the anticipated effect. We find that many climatic shocks are associated with a 
fall in welfare. For instance, floods, droughts, and late rains all tend to reduce income. Typhoid is 
associated with a fall in health status and school enrollment. Other results are more puzzling, such 
as the positive association between other livestock diseases and improvement in two of our welfare 
indicators. In this case, it is possible that higher prosperity leads households to buy, sell, and keep 
more livestock, thereby creating conditions favorable to epidemics. The positive association 
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between plant diseases and income and health status may be due to the fact that plant diseases are 
more common in humid years when incomes are high. 
 
It is conceivable that recent shocks loom larger in respondents' assessment of improvements in 
welfare. To investigate this possibility, we reestimate Table 6 using only shocks reported to 2001. 
Results, not shown here to save space, are basically identical to those reported in Table 6. We also 
worry that, given the high frequency of many reported shocks, they approximate average incidence 
rather than shock. To correct for this possibility, we regress shock measures on a large number of 
commune physical characteristics, such as latitude, longitude, elevation, average rainfall, and the 
like. The residuals from these regressions represent variation in shock variables that cannot be 
attributed to time-invariant characteristics. We then obtain the residuals from these regressions and 
use them as proxies for unanticipated shocks in Table 6. Results, not shown here to save space, 
yield a stronger estimated effect of the insecurity variable, which is significant not only in the 
income and health status regressions but also in the infant mortality regression. 
 
As emphasized in the literature on treatment effects (e.g. Lee, 2005; Wooldridge, 2002), the results 
in Table 6 may be misleading if treated and untreated observations have very different values of the 
control variables. The linear functional form imposed by the regression framework can yield 
misleading results if the true slope of the treatment effect varies across communes with different 
characteristics (Dehejia and Wahba, 1999). To correct for this possibility, we need to compare 
treated and untreated communes that are comparable. Various non-parametric matching techniques 
have been proposed that seek to compare treated observations only to untreated observations with 
similar observable characteristics. One of these methods is propensity score matching, but there are 
more general matching methods as well. 
 
To fit our analysis into this framework, let us define as treated those communes that suffered an 
increase in insecurity; those that did not are controls. Roughly half of the communes fall in each 
category. We report in Table 7 the results obtained using two different matching techniques. 
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The first one is the nearest neighbor matching method proposed by Abadie, Drukker, Herr and 
Imbens (2004). To understand how this method works, say the vector of covariates is x. We want a 
measure of distance between the x's. One easy metric is the vector norm (x’Vx)1/2 where V is 
a positive definite weight matrix. The distance ||x1 –x2||V between two vectors x1 and x2 is then  
||x1 –x2||V = ((x1 –x2)’V(x1 –x2))1/2 
Abadie et al. (2004) recommend letting V = S-1 where S is the covariance matrix of covariates x. 
This metric is referred to as the Mahalanobis metric. We implement this method using all the 
controls appearing in Table 6 as part of the covariate vector x. 
 
The second set of results reported in Table 7 is based on propensity score matching. In this method, 
we begin by regressing treatment on the controls, the results of which are shown in Table A2 in 
appendix.x The predicted probability of treatment generated by this regression is called the 
propensity score. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have shown that, as long as there is no selection on 
unobservables, the effect of the treatment can be consistently measured by comparing treated and 
untreated communes with similar propensity scores. 
 
Estimates of the average treatment effect for our four welfare variables of interest are presented in 
Table 7, using common support. For propensity score matching, we use the radius method with a 
caliper of 0.1 as this yields the most stable results. For comparison purpose we also report results 
for the unmatched. Results are very similar to those reported in Table 6: both matching estimators 
yield a significant difference between treated and control for average income and health status, but 
no significant effect infant mortality and school enrollment. This confirms that the results reported 
in Table 6 are not an artifact of the regression framework. 
 
There remains the possibility that the gripe variables do not fully control for response bias. The 
resulting measurement error in the insecurity variable may lead to endogeneity bias. In an attempt 
to correct for this source of bias, we seek to instrument the insecurity variable. To do this, we need 
to find an instrument for the change in insecurity over the years preceding the survey. We use the 
population census of 1993 to construct two variables that are likely to affect subsequent changes in 
crime but could not have been caused by it. In Madagascar, the presence of young men in the 
village is likely to improve the security situation. This is because rural insecurity is often due to 
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gangs that attack villages to steal cattle, a point that has been emphasized repeatedly in the 
anthropological literature (e.g. Rasamoelina, 2000; Razafitsiamidy, 1997) and in regression 
analysis of crime in Madagascar (Fafchamps and Moser, 2003). Young males make communities 
less vulnerable to such attacks and may serve as a deterrent.xi 
 
To capture this idea, we construct a variable that measures the growth in the proportion of teenage 
males in the commune population. The 1993 population census report age in 5-year categories. 
Males aged 10 to 14 in 1993 will be between 13 and 17 in 1996 and between 18 and 22 in 2001. 
These are the teenage males in the recall period covered by the commune survey. Let their 
proportion in the population be written S10-14. In contrast, males aged 15 to 19 in 1993 were 
teenagers at the time of the census but have basically become adults by the time of our recall 
period. Let their proportion in the population be written S15-19. The regressor is ∆S = S10-14 - S15-19; if 
it is positive, there are more teenage males during the survey recall period relative to the preceding 
5 year period -- and vice versa if it negative. If the presence of teenage males deters thieves, the 
variable should have a negative effect on insecurity: more teenage males relative to the preceding 
period reduces insecurity. To allow for spillover effects across communes, we use ∆S in 
neighboring communes as additional regressor in the propensity score regression. While this 
identification strategy is not ideal -- i.e., it does not rely on a controlled or quasi experimental 
source of variation in insecurity -- it should satisfy the exclusion restriction and it is the best we can 
do with the available data. 
 
The instrumenting regression, shown in Table A3 in appendix, is basically the same as Table A2 
except that it includes two more variables and is estimated using least squares. As expected, a 
higher proportion of young males is associated with a smaller increase in insecurity. The population 
variables are jointly significant but the value of the joint F-test is below 10, suggesting that we have 
a weak instrument problem. 
 
Regression results with instrumented insecurity are shown in Table 8. Overidentification tests of 
the validity of the instruments fail to reject the null hypothesis that instruments are uncorrelated 
with the errors in the main regression. Since we have weak instruments we apply the Anderson-
Rubin test as implemented by Moreira (2001). This procedure corrects the threshold value for the 
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significance of the insecurity variable that allows for weak instruments. The results from this test 
are reported at the bottom of Table 8. 
 
Results show a massive increase in the magnitude of the insecurity coefficient (6.5 to 25 times 
larger). This is consistent with the presence of measurement error, uninstrumented results suffering 
from attenuation bias. This is hardly surprising given that subjective rankings are known to vary 
with mood, time of the day, and other psychological and physiological factors (e.g. Frey and 
Stutzer, 2002; Diener, Suh, Lucas and Smith, 1999; Layard, 2002). After instrumentation, the 
insecurity variable is significant with the anticipated sign in the income, health status, and infant 
mortality regressions. These results accord serve as an additional confirmation that the association 
between changes in welfare and insecurity is not simply a consequence of response bias. 
 
V. Possible Channels 
 
Having documented a robust relationship between insecurity and certain dimensions of welfare, we 
briefly examine possible channels through which this relationship may take place. We begin by 
reporting the opinion of the respondents. Each focus group was asked to provide the main cause for 
the change in each of the four welfare indicators. Their responses, broken into categories, are 
summarized in Table 9. 
 
The most often cited cause for variation in income is a change in agricultural prices.xii Insecurity 
is listed as the main reason for change in income by 8% of the communes. This is a fairly 
remarkable result since a change in insecurity must be quite severe before being given as the main 
reason for changes in income in the commune as a whole. The provision of a new health center and 
of a new school is given as the most important reasons for changes in health status and school 
enrollment, respectively. Health facilities also loom large in responses regarding infant mortality. 
Contrary to income, insecurity is not often listed for health status, school attendance, and infant 
mortality. This may be misleading, however, because insecurity may hinder or delay the 
construction of new schools and health centers in affected communities. 
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To investigate this issue more in detail, we test whether an increase in insecurity is associated with 
a lower probability of attracting public services into the commune. We have information on when 
various infrastructures and services were first established in the studied communes. This 
information is summarized in Table 10 which shows the proportion of communes with the 
infrastructure or service in 1996 and 2001. We see that the study period witnessed a fairly large 
increase in the provision of secondary schools, basic health centers, and drinking water. The 
increase in agricultural input and output markets was less pronounced. 
 
Based on the information presented in the first panel of Table 10, we create dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 if a new infrastructure or service was instituted in the commune during the 1996-
2001 period. We then regress this dummy on the change in insecurity during the same period, as 
shown in equation (3). Of course, this regression is conditional on the commune not already having 
the infrastructure or service in 1996. We therefore estimate the model as a selection-corrected 
probit. Because the selection equation seeks to explain the level of infrastructure in 1996 -- not the 
change in the subsequent period -- we use time-invariant commune characteristics as regressors for 
the selection equation. To minimize selection bias in the change equation, we use a generous list of 
regressors including various geographical features thought to affect either the demand for public 
services or the cost and political desirability of providing them. The list includes longitude and 
latitude (major determinants of climate and thus of agricultural potential), elevation (Madagascar is 
a mountainous country), rainfall, temperature, soil type dummies, population density (based on the 
1993 census), distance from the nearest road, and ethnic and provincial dummies. All these 
regressors are clearly pre-determined and most are beyond human influence. Since these regressors 
are not our focus of interest, we need not discuss them any further. As before, we include gripe 
proxies in the welfare regressions and we control for the composition of focus groups. 
 
Regression results shown in Table 11 indicate that an increase in insecurity is associated with a 
lower likelihood that a secondary school or health center is built. Other public infrastructures such 
as drinking water and agricultural markets appear unaffected. The tentative conclusion we can draw 
from this and the earlier evidence is that insecurity affects welfare at least partly through lower 
provision of certain public services. It is worth noting that the two public services affected by 
insecurity, secondary schools and health centers, both require that an educated workforce (teachers, 
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doctors and nurses) live in the commune or nearby. Agricultural input and output markets, in 
contrast, are operated by small local traders who move across markets and need not reside in the 
affected areas (e.g. Fafchamps and Minten, 1999; Fafchamps, Gabre-Madhin and Minten, 2005). 
This contrast suggests that one factor that hinders the delivery of public services to insecure areas is 
the difficulty to convince teachers and health workers to work and reside there. 
 
We also have information on the number of new development projects taking place in the 
commune over the 1996-2001 period. As shown in Table 10, during this period the average number 
of new development projects per commune was 2.23 with a median of 2. Only 19% of communes 
did not have a new development project during the period. We regress the (log of the) number of 
new development projects (+1) on the change in insecurity. Results, presented in Table 12, again 
show a negative relationship: communes that experienced a deterioration of the security situation 
received fewer new development projects. The magnitude of the effect is non negligible: if the 
security situation worsened a bit instead of staying the same, this results in a 6% fall in the number 
of projects undertaken in the commune. Going from ‘worsened a lot’ to ‘improved a lot’ results in a 
25% increase in the number of development projects. Given that development projects typically 
aim at increasing incomes and improving welfare, this evidence suggests that insecurity also lowers 
welfare by discouraging the placement of development projects in affected areas. 
 
We conduct a similar analysis on manufacturing and mining employment. Results -- not shown 
here to save space -- show a significant negative effect of an increase in insecurity on employment 
growth in large manufacturing firms (more than 50 employees), but no effect on mining 
employment and on smaller manufacturers. To the extent that large firms depend more on 
sophisticated equipment and educated manpower, this again suggests that insecurity is less harmful 
to traditional, informal income generating activities than it is to economic activity of a more 
modern nature. 
 
The survey also provides some evidence that insecurity has a negative effect on agriculture. 
Respondents were asked what factors hinder the expansion of cultivated acreage in lowland 
(irrigated) and upland (non-irrigated) areas. Insecurity was cited by 10% of respondents for lowland 
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expansion and by 23% of respondents for upland expansion.xiii Insecurity is cited more often in 
land-abundant communes that are more remote and where insecurity is higher. 
Based on the work of Fafchamps and Minten (2006), Rasamoelina (2000), and Razafitsiamidy 
(1997), the fear of crop theft and of encounters with cattle thieves may be the dominant concerns of 
villagers. This provides yet another channel by which insecurity affects welfare: the fear of 
venturing too far from the village appears to discourage many farmers from expanding cultivated 
acreage and hence output. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Using original data collected by the authors, this paper has examined the relationship between 
insecurity and welfare. Identification of this relationship is not based on a controlled or natural 
experiment, so causal inference is potentially problematic and results should be interpreted in this 
light. We do, however, control for commune fixed effects – arguably the main cause for concern in 
analyses of this type. We also do our best to check the robustness of our results with respect to 
potential sources of bias, in particular omitted variable bias and response bias. 
 
The results show that an increase in insecurity, as perceived by respondents, is associated with 
lower incomes, school enrollment, and health status, and with a higher infant mortality. This 
association is consistently significant for incomes and health status. For school enrollment and 
infant mortality, it is only significant for some estimators. Results are robust to the inclusion of 
shocks potentially affecting both welfare and insecurity. These findings are in contrast to those of 
Deininger (2003) who found no effect of crime on rural incomes in Uganda. 
 
We then turned to the channels through which insecurity may affect welfare. We find a significant 
relationship between an increase in insecurity and improvements in the provision of certain public 
services, notably schooling and health care. We find a similar relationship with the placement of 
development projects. We also find some evidence that insecurity is associated with an 
employment reduction in large manufacturing firms – but not in mining -- and that it discourages 
farmers from expanding cultivated acreage.xiv 
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Taken together, the evidence suggests that insecurity is probably an important determinant of 
welfare in the country studied. Insecurity seems to affect welfare in many ways: through incomes 
via its effect on economic activity and development projects; and through access to public services 
by hindering the placement of social infrastructures in insecure areas. Certain types of public 
services -- schools and health centers -- and certain types of economic activity -- e.g., large-scale 
manufacturing -- appear more sensitive to insecurity than others such as mining and agricultural 
trade. 
 
These findings raise the issue of why insecurity is so pervasive in Madagascar. The lax attitude of 
police, courts, and jail institutions appears largely responsible for this state of affairs (e.g. Root, 
1993; World Bank, 1995). Fafchamps and Moser (2003), for instance, show that police presence 
has no deterrent effect on crime in Madagascar. Based on a survey of legal institutions in the 
country, the Ministère de la Justice (1999) documents many shortcomings in the implementation of 
existing laws. In particular, it is common for convicted criminals to be allowed out of jail in 
exchange for money. As a result, only petty criminals who cannot afford to pay remain in prison. 
 
To further investigate this possibility, a question on jail effectiveness was asked to focus group 
respondents in a follow-up survey.xv Respondents were asked whether, if a major cattle thief were 
found in the commune, he would be sent to prison and would stay there. Responses, summarized in 
Table 13, show a sharp contrast between provinces. While the majority of respondents living in the 
Central highlands (Antananarivo and Fianarantsoa) believe that the thief would be sent to jail, 
respondents in other parts of the country -- most notably Antsiranana – overwhelmingly believe the 
thief would either not be convicted or, if convicted, would not serve his sentence. 
 
These findings suggest that a major effort is long overdue to restructure and discipline the police 
and especially the prison institutions in Madagascar. The main focus should be organized crime, 
particularly cattle rustling. The evidence presented here indeed suggests that the insecurity 
generated by crime, especially in remote rural areas, discourages economic activity and makes it 
difficult to provide essential public services such as health care and schooling. 
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Table 1: Evolution of insecurity and welfare
Level of Average Health School Infant 
Percentage of insecurity income status enrollment mortality
responses in commune of inhab. of inhab. in commune in commune
Increased a lot 3% 10% 12% 14% 4%
Increased a bit 27% 40% 61% 55% 20%
Stayed the same 19% 15% 16% 14% 17%
Decreased a bit 39% 28% 7% 12% 46%
Decreased a lot 12% 7% 5% 4% 12%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
No of valid observations 1379 1351 1349 1347 1294
Evolution compared to five years ago
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Table 2: Crime and insecurity statistics
A. Perceptions of insecurity by communal focus groups
Percentage of responses
Very bad 9%
Bad 19%
Average 47%
Good 21%
Very good 4%
Total 100%
Yes=1  30%
1. Agriculture 27%
2. Roads 26%
3. Insecuity 15%
4. Health 14%
5. Education 10%
6. Water 6%
7. Environment 2%
Total 100%
No of valid observations 1379
B. Crime statistics
All figures reported in number of cases per year and per 100,000 inhabitants
Mean Median Std. dev.
Number of stolen cattle 1496.0 62.0 5754
Number of stolen vehicles 0.2 0.0 2
Number of burglaries 42.8 7.9 97
Number of homicides 8.5 2.1 20
Number of rapes 2.9 0.0 10
C. Composition of focus groups
Average number of participants 8.6
Occupation:
Communal employees 40%
Social/public service employees 21%
Village (fokontany) heads 6%
Farmers 14%
Others 19%
 
Level of insecurity in the commune
Communes in 'red zone' 
Stated first priority for development
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Table 3: Link subjective and objective insecurity measures
              ordered probit regression
Crime Unit Coefficient z-value
Comm. within "zone rouge" yes=1 -1.001 -10.60
Number of stolen cattle annually log(x+1) -0.110 -7.91
Number of cars stolen annually log(x+1) 0.001 0.00
Number of homicides annually log(x+1) -0.068 -2.19
Number of burglaries annually log(x+1) -0.089 -4.51
Number of rapes annually log(x+1) -0.035 -0.89
Composition of focus group
size of the group log(x) 0.022 0.17
number of communal employees share 0.121 0.50
number of social/public employees share 0.073 0.29
number of village leaders share 0.279 0.71
number of farmers share 0.065 0.21
Province dummies Yes
cutoff points   
1 -2.649
2 -1.570
3 0.053
4 1.228
Number of observations 1362
Pseudo R2 0.15
Dependent variable takes values from 1 (very bad) to 5 (very good)
Crime statistics: average of three preceding years
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Table 4: Ordered probit regressions of welfare indicators on insecurity
Changes in:
Average income Health status School enrollment Child mortality
Insecurity Coef. z-stat. Coef. z-stat. Coef. z-stat. Coef. z-stat.
Increase in insecurity -0.181 -3.10 -0.171 -2.80 -0.116 -1.94 0.085 1.41
Composition of focus group
Size of the group (in log) -0.183 -1.84 0.028 0.28 0.238 2.38 -0.248 -2.46
Share communal employees 0.210 0.93 0.080 0.34 0.039 0.17 0.328 1.39
Share social/public employees 0.270 1.05 1.180 4.38 0.619 2.34 0.254 0.94
Share village leaders 0.352 0.87 0.031 0.07 -0.705 -1.71 -0.454 -1.09
Share farmers -0.099 -0.34 0.217 0.72 0.177 0.60 -0.219 -0.72
Cutoff points
1 -1.804 -2.39 -1.399 -2.00 -1.151 -1.74 -1.502 -2.10
2 -0.686 -1.27 -0.918 -1.52 -0.396 -0.98 -0.106 -0.70
3 -0.303 -0.88 -0.308 -0.90 0.075 -0.51 0.381 -0.21
4 0.995 0.41 1.503 0.90 1.651 1.06 1.457 0.85
Number of observations 1343 1341 1339 1286
Pseudo R2 0.0060 0.0117 0.0069 0.0063
Each dependent variable takes values from 1 (worsened a lot) to 5 (improved a lot)
The insecurity variable takes values from 1 (improved a lot) to 5 (worsened a lot).
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics for diseases and shocks
Climatic and agricultural shocks Mean Std. Dev
Cyclone 0.6 0.80
Flood 1.2 1.16
Broken bridge or cut road 1.2 1.29
Drought 1.0 1.17
Rice fleas 1.1 1.36
Phytosanitary diseases 1.7 1.42
Frost 0.4 0.85
Locusts 0.8 0.87
Late start of rains 1.4 1.16
Human diseases
Malaria 2.8 0.78
Tuberculosis 1.7 1.39
Typhoid 1.0 1.31
Cholera 0.5 0.83
Plague 0.3 0.77
Livestock diseases
Distomatosis 2.5 1.07
Maladie du charbon bacterien 1.3 1.41
Maladie du charbon symptomatique 1.9 1.33
Pig plague 1.6 1.28
Newcastle disease (chicken) 2.7 0.87
Other livestock epidemic 0.7 1.22
Number of valid observations 1378
Each variable measures the number of years the commune was affected 
by a shock or disease in the three years preceding the survey.
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Table 6: Ordered probit regressions with additional controls
Changes in:
Average income Health status School enrollment Child mortality
Insecurity Coef. z-stat. Coef. z-stat. Coef. z-stat. Coef. z-stat.
Increase in insecurity -0.073 -2.42 -0.078 -2.54 -0.032 -1.01 0.042 1.37
Composition of focus group
Size of the group (in log) -0.053 -0.47 0.059 0.50 0.160 1.48 -0.070 -0.72
Share communal employees -0.157 -0.59 -0.244 -0.92 -0.352 -1.35 0.378 1.46
Share social/public employees -0.070 -0.24 0.888 3.00 0.438 1.52 0.429 1.47
Share village leaders 0.231 0.60 0.128 0.31 -0.524 -1.30 -0.395 -0.92
Share farmers -0.033 -0.10 0.279 0.84 0.235 0.71 0.110 0.33
Gripe proxy from rainfall regression (*) 0.161 1.52 0.101 0.96 0.022 0.22 0.197 1.83
Gripe proxy from crime regression (**) 0.025 0.61 0.049 1.22 0.060 1.36 -0.021 -0.48
Climatic and agricultural shocks 
Cyclone 0.078 1.81 -0.017 -0.39 0.061 1.35 -0.056 -1.34
Flood -0.052 -1.72 0.032 1.04 0.052 1.74 -0.026 -0.90
Broken bridge or cut road -0.027 -1.06 -0.040 -1.50 -0.039 -1.51 -0.037 -1.43
Drought -0.121 -3.99 -0.019 -0.61 -0.047 -1.54 0.013 0.46
Rice fleas -0.061 -2.30 -0.059 -2.14 -0.033 -1.23 0.005 0.19
Plant diseases 0.046 1.91 0.040 1.62 0.009 0.39 -0.022 -0.87
Frost/hail 0.033 0.84 0.072 1.93 0.015 0.37 0.060 1.54
Locusts -0.004 -0.10 -0.056 -1.35 -0.036 -0.89 -0.005 -0.13
Late start of rains -0.158 -3.82 -0.094 -2.39 0.029 0.71 0.000 0.01
Human diseases
Tuberculosis 0.023 0.89 -0.031 -1.14 -0.007 -0.25 0.002 0.07
Typhoid 0.004 0.15 0.007 0.23 0.005 0.19 0.026 0.85
Cholera 0.026 1.01 0.011 0.40 0.010 0.39 -0.008 -0.31
Plague 0.020 0.75 0.037 1.38 0.033 1.30 -0.020 -0.78
Livestock diseases
Maladie du charbon bacterien -0.018 -0.72 0.021 0.84 0.024 0.96 0.027 1.12
Maladie du charbon symptomatique 0.035 1.29 -0.051 -1.83 -0.044 -1.59 0.018 0.66
Pig plague 0.052 1.15 0.008 0.18 0.098 2.34 -0.035 -0.78
Other livestock epidemic 0.091 2.43 0.025 0.59 -0.016 -0.38 -0.053 -1.18
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
cutoff points
1 -2.283 -2.041 -1.873 -1.283
2 -1.072 -1.547 -1.086 0.164
3 -0.652 -0.901 -0.598 0.666
4 0.705 0.971 1.028 1.753
Number of observations 1311 1309 1307 1260
Each dependent variable takes values from 1 (worsened a lot) to 5 (improved a lot)
The insecurity variable takes values from 1 (improved a lot) to 5 (worsened a lot).
(*) Residual from Table A1.
(**) Residual from OLS regression with same regressors as Table 3.
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Table 7. Matching results
Average income #Treated #Controls Difference S.E. T-stat
Unmatched 655 672 -0.220 0.062 -3.50
Matched -- Nearest neighbor (*) 646 665 -0.133 0.072 -1.84
Matched -- PS Radius (**) 646 664 -0.141 0.066 -2.13
Health status
Unmatched 652 673 -0.167 0.051 -3.26
Matched -- Nearest neighbor (*) 643 666 -0.136 0.063 -2.16
Matched -- PS Radius (**) 643 665 -0.154 0.053 -2.88
School enrollment
Unmatched 650 672 -0.113 0.056 -2.03
Matched -- Nearest neighbor (*) 642 665 -0.016 0.070 -0.23
Matched -- PS Radius (**) 642 663 -0.094 0.059 -1.59
Infant mortality
Unmatched 620 652 0.049 0.060 0.08
Matched -- Nearest neighbor (*) 612 648 0.015 0.070 0.21
Matched -- PS Radius (**) 612 646 0.060 0.062 0.96
(*) Nearest neighbor matching using a Mahalanobis matrix on the complete X vector (nnmatch stata command)
(**) Propensity score matching using radius method, caliper=0.1 (attr stata command)
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Table 8. IV regressions of welfare indicators on insecurity
Changes in:
Average income Health status School enrollment Child mortality
Insecurity Coef. z-stat. Coef. z-stat. Coef. z-stat. Coef. z-stat.
Increase in insecurity (instrumented) -2.478** -2.548 -1.282** -2.083 -1.048 -1.551 1.906** 2.154
Composition of focus group
Size of the group (in log) 0.035 0.197 0.104 0.871 0.189 1.502 -0.157 -0.988
Share communal employees 0.069 0.186 0.072 0.282 -0.066 -0.248 0.124 0.363
Share social/public employees -0.341 -0.793 0.709** 2.421 0.389 1.261 0.634 1.606
Share village leaders -0.440 -0.666 -0.134 -0.300 -0.780 -1.620 0.121 0.200
Share farmers 0.833 1.472 0.755** 2.019 0.684* 1.707 -0.574 -1.132
Gripe proxy from rainfall regression (*) 0.244 1.597 0.118 1.139 0.029 0.268 0.184 1.339
Gripe proxy from crime regression (**) -0.287* -1.956 -0.117 -1.216 -0.090 -0.872 0.246* 1.808
Climatic and agricultural shocks 
Cyclone 0.007 0.097 -0.060 -1.296 0.021 0.436 0.005 0.081
Flood -0.027 -0.593 0.031 1.020 0.063** 1.969 -0.048 -1.195
Broken bridge or cut road -0.015 -0.404 -0.018 -0.690 -0.028 -1.041 -0.059* -1.716
Drought -0.033 -0.589 0.035 0.961 -0.009 -0.231 -0.067 -1.266
Rice fleas -0.113*** -2.691 -0.076*** -2.702 -0.044 -1.461 0.045 1.166
Plant diseases 0.053 1.544 0.027 1.152 0.010 0.398 -0.016 -0.513
Frost/hail 0.015 0.264 0.051 1.336 0.005 0.115 0.069 1.397
Locusts -0.062 -0.976 -0.083* -1.904 -0.052 -1.151 0.041 0.694
Late start of rains -0.223*** -3.512 -0.102** -2.401 0.005 0.104 0.042 0.724
Human diseases
Tuberculosis 0.019 0.493 0.024 0.933 0.032 1.144 -0.012 -0.347
Typhoid 0.023 0.615 -0.057** -2.188 -0.042 -1.564 0.030 0.893
Cholera 0.023 0.349 0.000 0.009 0.085* 1.829 0.005 0.092
Plague 0.052 0.840 0.004 0.086 -0.015 -0.340 -0.015 -0.272
Livestock diseases
Maladie du charbon bacterien 0.002 0.061 -0.033 -1.288 -0.019 -0.735 0.006 0.190
Maladie du charbon symptomatique 0.062 1.324 0.041 1.334 0.032 0.978 -0.017 -0.390
Pig plague 0.062 1.550 0.027 0.999 0.021 0.754 -0.033 -0.939
Other livestock epidemic -0.006 -0.150 0.020 0.757 0.024 0.881 -0.003 -0.088
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 4.238*** 7.995 3.909*** 10.951 3.713*** 9.871 2.419*** 5.109
Ch-sq(1) p-value Ch-sq(1) p-value Ch-sq(1) p-value Ch-sq(1) p-value
Overidentification test 0.161 0.688 0.064 0.800 0.127 0.721 0.002 0.967
test value 95% crit. test value 95% crit. test value 95% crit. test value 95% crit.
Anderson-Rubin test 13.9213 5.992 6.1229 5.992 3.1942 5.992 8.1227 5.992
Significance levels as follows:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *;
(*) Residual from Table A1.
(**) Residual from OLS regression with same regressors as Table 3.
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Table 9: Stated reasons by focus groups for evolution in welfare
Percentage of 
responses
Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase
Climatic or environmental shock 10% 1% 1% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0%
Improvement/degradation security 8% 8% 1% 1% 3% 1% 1% 1%
End/start of project from govt ou NGO 1% 6% 1% 3% 1% 2% 5% 3%
Loss of jobs/beneficiary from industrialization 1% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Change in access in transport 3% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Change in ag. income due to change in prices 61% 53% 10% 1% 8% 2% 1% 3%
Change in non-farm income 4% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Change in wage labor 2% 3% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Closing/opening of schools 0% 0% 1% 0% 42% 61% 1% 1%
Closing/opening of health centers 0% 0% 48% 67% 1% 1% 46% 57%
Change in school costs 0% 0% 0% 1% 17% 15% 2% 0%
Change in health costs 1% 0% 17% 14% 0% 0% 22% 16%
Others 10% 13% 19% 13% 27% 16% 22% 19%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Number of observations 479 674 156 979 226 931 762 311
of inhabitants of inhabitants in commune in commune
Evolution compared to five years ago
Average income Health status School enrollment Infant mortality
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Table 10: Infrastructure, services and projects
Percentage of communes with: In 1996 In 2001
Secondary school 46% 53%
Basic health center 65% 94%
Drinking water (government and non-governmental) 25% 39%
Seller of agricultural inputs 10% 17%
Agricultural market 32% 37%
New development projects since 1996: Mean Median
Average number per commune 2.23 2
% of communes where there were none 19%
Number of observations 1383
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Table 11: Probit regressions with selection correction
Construction of Construction of Provision of New market for New supplier of
 school health center drinking water agricultural output agricultural inputs
Change in 1996-2001 period Coef. z-stat. Coef. z-stat. Coef. z-stat. Coef. z-stat. Coef. z-stat.
Increase in insecurity -0.110 -2.12 -0.108 -2.15 -0.013 -0.32 0.017 0.27 0.018 0.35
Composition of focus group
Size of the group (in log) 0.132 0.96 -0.131 -0.76 0.100 0.59 0.206 1.05 -0.308 -1.86
Share communal employees 0.275 0.58 -0.433 -0.92 0.284 0.81 -0.037 -0.08 -0.441 -1.01
Share social/public employees 0.740 1.55 2.043 3.03 0.516 1.32 -0.437 -0.80 0.425 0.87
Share village leaders 0.643 0.87 -0.402 -0.48 -0.164 -0.28 -0.886 -0.81 -0.008 -0.01
Share farmers -0.876 -1.42 -1.525 -2.73 -0.321 -0.73 0.190 0.40 -0.955 -1.68
Gripe proxy from rainfall regression (*) 0.081 0.63 0.129 0.79 0.031 0.30 0.117 0.86 -0.020 -0.16
Gripe proxy from crime regression (**) -0.045 -0.60 -0.117 -1.28 0.050 0.84 -0.006 -0.08 0.042 0.63
Intercept -1.702 -3.29 2.306 3.93 -1.423 -2.80 -2.047 -3.44 -0.678 -1.26
Selection equation: no service in 1996
Longitude 0.033 0.65 -0.079 -1.56 -0.093 -1.54 0.155 2.80 -0.063 -0.56
Latitude -0.159 -3.16 -0.068 -1.31 -0.026 -0.40 0.067 1.24 0.015 0.18
Mean elevation 0.000 0.34 0.000 0.12 0.000 0.20 0.000 0.58 -0.001 -0.42
Mean elevation squared 0.000 0.90 0.000 0.22 0.000 0.25 0.000 -1.37 0.000 -1.49
Mean rainfall 0.000 0.27 -0.001 -2.28 0.000 0.66 -0.001 -1.02 0.000 0.07
Mean rainfall squared 0.000 -0.35 0.000 1.96 0.000 -0.37 0.000 0.95 0.000 0.25
Mean temperature 0.060 0.91 0.047 0.73 -0.126 -1.72 -0.126 -1.77 -0.182 -1.89
Mean temperature squared 0.000 -0.63 0.000 -0.72 0.000 2.06 0.000 1.71 0.000 1.45
Soil type 2 0.000 -0.13 -0.003 -1.18 0.008 3.28 0.002 0.99 0.000 0.03
Soil type 3 -0.001 -0.20 -0.006 -1.41 0.005 1.27 0.002 0.41 -0.008 -1.53
Soil type 4 0.002 0.77 -0.001 -0.57 0.007 2.73 0.007 2.86 0.010 2.21
Soil type 5 0.008 2.82 0.005 1.93 0.008 2.56 0.002 0.78 0.015 2.40
Soil type 6 0.006 2.21 0.000 -0.10 0.009 2.89 0.005 1.68 0.001 0.18
Soil type 7 -0.001 -0.41 -0.002 -0.84 0.005 2.05 -0.002 -0.64 -0.004 -1.10
Log of population density -0.257 -5.98 0.047 1.21 -0.222 -4.84 -0.245 -5.78 -0.293 -5.23
Log of travel time to nearest town 0.058 1.42 -0.079 -1.95 0.227 4.54 0.074 1.61 0.150 2.03
Forest ethnic groups 0.004 1.61 -0.006 -2.67 0.000 0.14 0.001 0.50 0.013 1.97
Livestock raising ethnic groups -0.001 -0.39 -0.002 -1.33 0.000 0.11 -0.001 -0.27 0.001 0.16
Western ethnic groups -0.003 -0.92 -0.007 -2.33 -0.006 -1.69 0.004 1.25 0.006 1.11
Eastern ethnic groups 0.002 0.72 0.002 0.99 0.002 0.69 0.004 1.80 0.006 1.70
Size of the group (in log) -0.242 -1.63 -0.022 -0.15 0.487 2.80 0.274 1.73 -0.350 -1.89
Share communal employees -0.392 -1.28 -0.197 -0.66 0.413 1.25 0.525 1.68 -0.357 -0.75
Share social/public employees -1.402 -4.16 -0.261 -0.76 -0.022 -0.06 -0.220 -0.62 -1.537 -2.91
Share village leaders 1.531 2.85 -0.094 -0.18 1.035 1.71 2.614 4.43 1.620 2.06
Share farmers 0.039 0.10 0.299 0.79 1.373 3.08 0.554 1.42 0.519 0.76
Gripe proxy from rainfall regression (*) 0.112 1.27 0.194 2.11 0.101 0.97 -0.154 -1.68 -0.252 -1.93
Gripe proxy from crime regression (**) 0.029 0.61 -0.024 -0.51 0.019 0.33 0.007 0.15 -0.078 -1.14
Province dummies
Intercept -0.545 -0.08 0.712 0.11 11.207 1.46 8.131 1.06 26.279 2.58
Number of uncensored observations 701 459 990 890 1171
(*) Residual from Table A1.
(**) Residual from OLS regression with same regressors as Table 3.
Included but not shown
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Table 12: Development projects started up over the last five years
Change in 1996-2001 period Coef. z-stat.
Increase in insecurity -0.071 -4.33
Composition of focus group
Size of the group (in log) 0.279 4.97
Share communal employees -0.090 -0.73
Share social/public employees -0.028 -0.20
Share village leaders -1.034 -4.50
Share farmers -0.237 -1.45
Gripe proxy from rainfall regression (*) -0.049 -1.13
Gripe proxy from crime regression (**) -0.019 -0.81
Intercept 0.731 4.20
Number of observations 1360
Dependent variable is log(number of new development projects+1)
(*) Residual from Table A1.
(**) Residual from OLS regression with same regressors as Table 3.
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Table 13: Confidence in the justice system
Answer to hypothetical question:
"Suppose that a famous cattle thief is caught, will he be sent to prison and will he stay there?"
 Very sure Sure Maybe Probably not Total
Antananarivo 46% 42% 12% 0% 100%
Fianarantsoa 17% 37% 17% 29% 100%
Toamasina 37% 19% 11% 33% 100%
Mahajanga 21% 8% 54% 17% 100%
Toliara 8% 25% 50% 17% 100%
Antsiranana 0% 12% 21% 67% 100%
Madagascar 22% 24% 27% 27% 100%
Number of valid observations 32 35 40 41 148
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Table A1. Regression of own perception of rainfall 
 Coeff. t-value
Average perception of rainfall 
in contiguous communes 0.739913 20.87
Intercept 0.155252 6.57
Number of observations 1383
R-squared 0.240
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Table A2: Propensity score regression 
Composition of focus group Coefficient t-value
Size of the group (in log) 0.144 1.019
Share communal employees 0.241 0.809
Share social/public employees -0.440 -1.290
Share village leaders -0.827 -1.623
Share farmers 0.941** 2.493
Gripe proxy from rainfall regression (*) 0.041 0.321
Gripe proxy from crime regression (**) -0.391*** -8.234
Climatic and agricultural shocks 
Cyclone -0.088* -1.755
Flood 0.040 1.126
Broken bridge or cut road 0.024 0.767
Dought 0.095*** 2.707
Rice fleas -0.046 -1.500
Phytosanitary diseases 0.001 0.040
Frost/hail -0.031 -0.676
Locusts -0.057 -1.152
Late start of rains -0.073 -1.509
Human diseases
Tuberculosis 0.049* 1.733
Typhoid -0.017 -0.550
Cholera -0.050 -0.963
Plague -0.044 -0.857
Livestock diseases
Maladie du charbon bacterien -0.006 -0.194
Maladie du charbon symptomatique 0.055 1.605
Pig plague 0.042 1.358
Other livestock epidemic -0.024 -0.778
Province dummies
 Intercept -0.862** -2.069
Number of observations 1352
Significance levels as follows:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *;
(*) Residual from Table A1.
(**) Residual from OLS regression with same regressors as Table 3.
Yes
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Table A3: Instrumenting regression for increase in insecurity
Share of pop. 10-14 - share of pop. 15-19 (1993) Coefficient t-value
In commune -4.793** -1.972
In neighboring communes -6.808* -1.746
Composition of focus group
Size of the group (in log) 0.064 1.228
Share communal employees 0.094 0.882
Share social/public employees -0.133 -1.101
Share village leaders -0.299* -1.707
Share farmers 0.326** 2.498
Gripe proxy from rainfall regression (*) 0.015 0.338
Gripe proxy from crime regression (**) -0.141*** -8.291
Climatic and agricultural shocks 
Cyclone -0.033* -1.764
Flood 0.014 1.047
Broken bridge or cut road 0.008 0.748
Dought 0.037*** 2.773
Rice fleas -0.020* -1.762
Phytosanitary diseases 0.005 0.439
Frost/hail -0.004 -0.260
Locusts -0.022 -1.265
Late start of rains -0.030* -1.662
Human diseases
Tuberculosis 0.015 1.466
Typhoid -0.009 -0.778
Cholera -0.018 -0.992
Plague -0.008 -0.504
Livestock diseases
Maladie du charbon bacterien -0.002 -0.193
Maladie du charbon symptomatique 0.017 1.375
Pig plague 0.017 1.532
Other livestock epidemic -0.008 -0.752
Province dummies Yes
 Intercept 0.286* 1.814
Number of observations 1335
R-squared 0.1335
Test that instruments are jointly significant F(2, 1305) p-value
5.98 0.0026
Significance levels as follows:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *;
(*) Residual from Table A1.
(**) Residual from OLS regression with same regressors as Table 3.
 
Page 42 of 44
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fjds
Journal of Development Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 
                                                 
i
 We have benefited from comments from Esther Duflo, Michael Kremer, Ted Miguel, and other 
participants to the McArthur conference held in Naivasha in 2006. We thank the World Bank and 
USAID for funding this research. We also would like to thank Elaine Ralison, Lalaina 
Randrianarson, Jean-Claude Randrianarisoa, Christine Moser, Milasoa Cherel-Robson and our 
team of enumerators for assisting with data collection. The support of the Economic and Social 
Research Council (UK) is gratefully acknowledged. The work was part of the programme of the 
ESRC Global Poverty Research Group. 
ii
 Department of Economics, University of Oxford, Manor Road, Oxford OX1 3UQ. Email: 
marcel.fafchamps@economics.ox.ac.uk. Fax: +44(0)1865-281447. Tel: +44(0)1865-281446. 
iii
 Senior Research Fellow, International Food Policy Research Institute, New Delhi Office, CG 
Block, NASC Complex, PUSA, New Delhi 110 012 India. Phone: +91 11-2584-6565/6566/6567. 
Email: B.Minten@cgiar.org 
iv
 After a disputed presidential election, the country was temporarily divided into two in early 2002, 
each faction occupying part of the island. After a blockade of the Central Highlands that lasted 
several months, the stand-off was eventually resolved when the incumbent president fled the 
country in June 2002. In spite of th  severity of the political crisis, the level of political violence 
was kept surprisingly low, with estimates of crisis-related casualties numbering less than 100 
victims. 
v
 The exact number remains unclear due to the existence of conflicting “official” lists. This 
confusion is the result of changes in the boundaries and composition of some communes in the 
mid-1990s. 
vi
 Nine communes were missed in the survey, either because they are too isolated or too insecure or 
both. The number of missing communes is very small so selection bias is unlikely to be an issue in 
the estimation. 
vii
 The high incidence of cattle rustling may be related to traditional practices of certain ethnic 
groups. The Bara, one of the dominant ethnic groups in Southwestern Madagascar, are known 
cattle thieves because young men are supposed to prove their manhood by stealing cattle. When 
they have done so, they are ready to get married (Ramiarantsoa, 1995). The Sakalava have similar 
customs. Cattle rustling is more common in the western part of the island. This largely reflects the 
fact that this drier part of the island is most suitable for extensive livestock production, which 
naturally facilitates livestock theft (Smith, Barrett and Box, 2001). 
viii
 It is conceivable that the feeling of insecurity responds more strongly to recent events. To 
investigate this possibility, we reestimate the model using only crime reported in the year preceding 
the survey (2001) and only crime reported in 1999. We obtain slightly stronger results (higher t-
values) using 2001 crime data or the 1999-2001 average than using the 1999 numbers. But the 
results are otherwise quite similar. 
ix
 We omit malaria and two animal diseases -- distomatosis and Newcastle disease -- because they 
are endemic in the entire country and have too little variation for their coefficient to be identified. 
Including them does not change the conclusions regarding insecurity, however. 
x
 The regression by and large satisfies the balancing property. Balancedness is violated at the 5% 
level in two cases (out of a total of 24 variables times 7 blocks) involving two different variables in 
two different blocks, without any evidence of a pattern. 
xi
 It is also conceivable that the presence of young males coming of age during the period covered 
by our analysis had an worsening effect on crime and insecurity because crime (especially violent 
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crime) is often correlated with testosterone levels (Wilson, Daly and Pound, 2002). We would 
expect this pattern in societies where crime is perpetrated by nearby residents, but it is unlikely to 
apply to rural Madagascar where cattle rustling by itinerant gangs is the major security concern. 
xii
 Unfortunately, we do not have longitudinal information on agricultural prices at the commune 
level and cannot therefore test whether communes that became more insecure experienced a fall in 
agricultural prices. 
xiii
 For lowland cultivation, 3% of communes cited insecurity as the first reason for not expanding 
acreage; another 7% cited it as second reason. For upland cultivation, insecurity was cited as first 
and second reason by 8% and 15% of communes, respectively. 
xiv
 It is not contended that service provision helps welfare. It is thus not really necessary for us to 
demonstrate that a link exists in our data as well. The reader may nevertheless like to know that 
when change in public provision is added to Table 8, results conform with expectations -- adding a 
school raises school enrollment, adding agricultural input and output markets raises incomes, and 
adding a health center tends to raise health status and reduce infant mortality. The latter effect, 
however, is only significant at the 15 to 20% level. 
xv
 This survey covered a sample of 150 communes and was undertaken in November 2002. 
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